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Abstract—Wireless networks with directional antennas, like
millimeter wave (mmWave) networks, have enhanced security.
For a large-scale mmWave ad hoc network in which eaves-
droppers are randomly located, however, eavesdroppers can still
intercept the confidential messages, since they may reside in the
signal beam. This paper explores the potential of physical layer
security in mmWave ad hoc networks. Specifically, we charac-
terize the impact of mmWave channel characteristics, random
blockages, and antenna gains on the secrecy performance. For
the special case of uniform linear array (ULA), a tractable
approach is proposed to evaluate the average achievable secrecy
rate. We also characterize the impact of artificial noise in such
networks. Our results reveal that in the low transmit power
regime, the use of low mmWave frequency achieves better secrecy
performance, and when increasing transmit power, a transition
from low mmWave frequency to high mmWave frequency is
demanded for obtaining a higher secrecy rate. More antennas at
the transmitting nodes are needed to decrease the antenna gain
obtained by the eavesdroppers when using ULA. Eavesdroppers
can intercept more information by using a wide beam pattern.
Furthermore, the use of artificial noise may be ineffective for
enhancing the secrecy rate.
Index Terms—Ad hoc, millimeter wave, beamforming, uniform
linear array, average achievable secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless ad hoc networks have been widely applied in
several areas including tactical networks, device-to-device, and
personal area networking. Unfortunately, interference from
nearby transmitters severely deteriorate the throughput of ad
hoc networks either through reducing the link quality, or
reducing the number of links that can operate simultaneously.
Due to the lack of central coordination, beamforming or
directional antennas are one approach for suppressing inter-
ference [1]. Recently, millimeter wave (mmWave) has been
viewed as a promising technology for supporting high-speed
data rate in the mobile cellular systems [2]. MmWave with
directional transmissions and large bandwidths provides rich
opportunities for ad hoc networks. Compared to the lower
frequency counterpart, mmWave ad hoc networks experience
less interference and achieve greater rate coverage [3].
Security in ad hoc networks is important [4]. The traditional
higher-layer key distribution and management may increase
the burden of transmitting confidential messages in such
decentralized networks. Recent developments have shown that
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by leveraging the randomness inherent in wireless channels,
physical layer security can be a low-complexity alternative
for safeguarding complex wireless networks [5]. By taking
advantage of unique mmWave channel features, this paper
establishes the potential of physical layer security in mmWave
ad hoc networks.
A. Related Works and Motivation
Early work has studied the effects of channel fading on
physical layer security, see, e.g., [6, 7] and the references
therein. The implementation of cooperative jamming and
artificial noise can degrade the eavesdropper’s channel and
further improve secrecy [5, 8]. Recently, new network ar-
chitectures and emerging transmission technologies such as
heterogeneous networks (HetNets) and massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) have promoted more research on
physical layer security. In HetNets, dense small cells are
deployed, which results in ubiquitous inter-tier and intra-
tier interference. For secrecy communications at the physical
layer, such interference can be utilized for confounding the
eavesdroppers. In [9], spectrum allocation and transmit beam-
forming were designed for maximizing the secrecy rate in a
two-tier HetNet. In [10], an access threshold-based secrecy
mobile association policy was proposed in a K-tier HetNet.
Massive MIMO uses large number of antennas to provide high
array gains for legitimate receivers. The work of [11] studied
the case of jamming when the transmitter equipped with large
number of antennas served one single-antenna receiver. It
was shown in [12] that the application of random artificial
noise in massive MIMO cellular networks can achieve a better
performance/complexity tradeoff compared to the conventional
null space based artificial noise. In [13], secrecy and energy
efficiency in massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN was
studied, which showed that the centralized and distributed
large-scale antenna systems can coexist to enhance the se-
crecy and cut power consumption. While the aforementioned
literature has provided a solid understanding of physical layer
security in the wireless systems with lower-frequency bands
(sub-6 GHz), the research on mmWave secrecy communication
is in its infancy.
Physical layer security in decentralized wireless networks
such as sensor and ad hoc type of networks has been inves-
tigated in [14–17]. In [14], secrecy transmission capacity
under connection outage and secrecy outage concerns was
examined in an ad hoc network, in which both legitimate
nodes and eavesdroppers are randomly distributed. In [15], the
average achievable secrecy rate was examined in a three-tier
2sensor networks consisting of sensors, access points and sinks,
and it was shown that there exists optimal number of access
points for maximizing the average achievable secrecy rate.
Secrecy enhancement in ad hoc networks was studied in [16],
where two schemes for the generation of artificial noise were
compared. In [17], relay transmission in ad hoc networks was
evaluated from the perspective of security connectivity. Again,
these works solely focus on the lower-frequency secrecy
communications in decentralized wireless networks.
Due to the peculiar mmWave channel characteristics, phys-
ical layer security in mmWave systems has recently attracted
much interest [18–21]. In [18], mmWave antenna subset mod-
ulation was designed to secure point-to-point communication
by introducing randomness in the received constellation, which
confounds the eavesdropper. In [19], the mmWave multiple-
input, single-output, multiple-eavesdroppers channel was con-
sidered in a single cell, and it was indicated that high-speed
secure link at the mmWave frequencies could be reached with
the assistance of large antenna arrays and large mmWave
bandwidths. The work of [20] illustrated the impacts of key
factors such as large bandwidth and directionality on the
physical layer security in mmWave networks, and provided
more opportunities and challenges in this field. In [21], it was
shown that even only one eavesdropper may be able to suc-
cessfully intercept highly directional mmWave transmission.
In the work of [21], although the eavesdropper was located
outside the signal beam, reflections could be exploited by the
eavesdropper that used small-scale reflectors within the beam,
which has little blockage effect on the legitimate receiver’s per-
formance. Secrecy outage of an mmWave cellular network was
analyzed in [22], where authorized users and eavesdroppers
were assumed to be single-omnidirectional-antenna nodes.
In [23], secrecy outage of a mmWave overlaid microwave
network was derived by considering a specific blockage model
and assuming that mmWave channel undergoes Nakagami-
m fading for tractability. In two-way amplify-and-forward
MIMO relaying networks, [24] proposed mmWave secrecy
beamforming schemes to maximize the secrecy sum rate.
Prior work only pays attention to the physical layer security
in lower-frequency ad hoc networks. In mmWave ad hoc
networks, the directional communication with narrow beam
is more robust against eavesdropping. The mmWave link is
sensitive to the blockage and experiences higher propagation
loss, and mmWave channel undergoes rapid fluctuation and
has much lower coherence time than the today’s networks
because of much larger Doppler spread [25]. Hence mmWave
link is more random and hard to be intercepted by malicious
eavesdroppers compared to the low-frequency counterpart.
B. Approach and Contributions
This paper studies physical layer security in mmWave ad
hoc networks. Our analysis accounts for the key features
of mmWave channel and the effects of different antenna
array gains and node densities. The detailed contributions and
insights are summarized as follows.
• We model the mmWave ad hoc networks with the help
of stochastic geometry, to characterize the random spa-
tial locations of transmitting nodes and eavesdroppers.
The effect of blockage is also incorporated such that
links are either line-of-sight (LoS) or non-line-of-sight
(NLoS). The average achievable secrecy rate is derived
to quantify the impacts of key system parameters such
as antenna gain, transmitting node and eavesdropper
densities on the secrecy performance. Our results show
that with increasing transmit power, a transition from low
mmWave frequency to high mmWave frequency is needed
for achieving better secrecy performance. Compared to
eavesdropping, the performance is dominated by the
surrounding interference in the high node density case.
The use of different mmWave frequencies has a big
impact on the secrecy performance, which needs to be
carefully selected in practice.
• We develop an approach to evaluate the average achiev-
able secrecy rate when utilizing uniform linear array
(ULA). Our results show that adding more antennas at
the transmitting node decreases antenna gains obtained
by eavesdroppers.
• We examine the impact of artificial noise on the secrecy
rate. Our results show that in mmWave ad hoc networks,
the use of artificial noise can still enhance the secrecy
when power allocation between the information signal
and artificial noise is properly set. Moreover, the use
of artificial noise may have an adverse effect on the
secrecy rate in the low node density scenarios, where
more transmit power should be allocated to improve the
transmission rate between the transmitting node and its
intended receiver.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the network and the mmWave channel model.
Section III evaluates the average achievable secrecy rate of
this network and also discusses the implementation of uniform
linear array. Section IV analyzes the use of artificial noise on
the secrecy performance. Numerical results are provided in
Section V and conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a mmWave ad hoc network, where a group of
transmitting nodes are randomly distributed following a ho-
mogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) Φ with λ. The dipole
model is adopted [26], where the distance for a typical trans-
mitting node-receiver is fixed at r, and the typical receiver is
assumed to be located at the origin. Both the transmitting node
and its corresponding receiver use directional beamforming for
data transmission, which is intercepted by multiple eavesdrop-
pers. We consider the case of passive eavesdropping without
any active attacks to deteriorate the information transmission.
The locations of eavesdroppers are modeled following an
independent homogeneous PPP Φe with λe. We consider the
directional beamforming and use a sectored model to analyze
the beam pattern [3, 27–29] (See Fig. 1 in [3]), i.e., the
effective antenna gain for an interferer i seen by the typical
3receiver is expressed as
Gi =

G2M, PrMM=
(
θ
2π
)2
,
GMGm, PrMm=
θ(2π−θ)
(2π)2 ,
GmGM, PrMm=
θ(2π−θ)
(2π)2 ,
G2m, Prmm =
(
2π−θ
2π
)2
,
(1)
where GM denotes the main-lobe gain with the beamwidth
θ, Gm denotes the back-lobe gain, and Prℓk (ℓ, k ∈ {M,m})
denotes the probability that the antenna gain GℓGk occurs. We
assume that the maximum array gain GMGM is obtained for
the typical transmitting node-receiver.
In light of the blockage effects in the outdoor scenario,
the signal path can be LoS or NLoS. We denote fPr (R) as
the probability that a link at a distance R is LoS, while the
NLoS probability of a link is 1−fPr (R). The LoS probability
function fPr (R) can be obtained from field measurements or
stochastic blockage models [28].
We employ a short-range propagation model in which given
a distance |Xi|, the path loss function is denoted as L (|X |) =
β(max (d, |X |))−α with a reference distance d [30], where α
is the path loss exponent depending on the LoS or NLoS link,
namely α = αLoS for LoS link and α = αNLoS for NLoS link,
and β is the frequency independent constant parameter of the
path loss, which is commonly set as ( c4πfc )
2 with c = 3 ×
108m/s and the carrier frequency fc. Hence there are different
β values for different mmWave frequencies, which allows us
to examine the effects of using different mmWave frequencies.
Note that the sparse scattering mmWave environment makes
many traditional fading distributions invalid for the modeling
of the mmWave channel [31]. For tractability, we neglect small
scale fading as [32] argues that fading is not significant in
LOS links with significant beamforming. Hence the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at a typical receiver is
written as
γo =
PtG
2
ML (r)∑
i∈Φ/o PtGiL (|Xi|) + σ2o
, (2)
where Pt denotes the transmit power, |Xi| is the distance
between the typical receiver and the interferer i ∈ Φ/o (except
the typical transmitting node), and σ2o is the noise power.
When the eavesdropping channel is degraded under the
effect of interference, secrecy indeed becomes better. In this
paper, we focus on the worst-case eavesdropping scenario,
where all the eavesdroppers can mitigate the interference.
In fact, eavesdroppers are usually assumed to have strong
ability, and they may cooperate with each other to cancel the
interference, as seen in [33]. We assume that the eavesdropping
channels are independent of the legitimate channel1. In such a
scenario, the most malicious eavesdropper that has the largest
SINR of the received signal dominates the secrecy rate [35].
Thus, the SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper is written
as
γe∗ = max
e∈Φe
{
PtGeL (|Xe|)
σ2e
}
, (3)
1We highlight that the secrecy in the mmWave correlated wiretap channel
is a novel and important research area, and the existing contributions at lower
frequencies can be seen in [34].
where |Xe| is the distance between the typical transmitting
node and the eavesdropper e ∈ Φe, σ2e is the power of noise
and weak interference, and Ge is the antenna gain seen from
the eavesdropper e ∈ Φe described by
Ge =

GMG
e
M, PrMM=
θφ
(2π)2
,
GMG
e
m, PrMm=
θ(2π−φ)
(2π)2
,
GmG
e
M, PrMm=
(2π−θ)φ
(2π)2
,
GmG
e
m, Prmm =
(2π−θ)(2π−φ)
(2π)2
,
(4)
in which φ, GeM and G
e
m are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain of the beam pattern used
by the eavesdropper e ∈ Φe, respectively.
III. SECRECY EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the average achievable secrecy
rate in mmWave ad hoc networks. As shown in [36], physical
layer security is commonly characterized by the secrecy rate
Rs, which is defined as
Rs = [log2 (1 + γo)− log2 (1 + γe∗)]+. (5)
Based on (5), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In mmWave ad hoc networks, the average
achievable secrecy rate is given by
Rs =
[
R−Re∗
]+
, (6)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0},R = E [log2 (1 + γo)] is the average
rate of the channel between the typical transmitting node and
its receiver, and Re∗ = E [log2 (1 + γe∗)] is the average rate
of the channel between the typical transmitting node and the
most malicious eavesdropper.
Proof 1: We first show that the average rate R is achievable
by considering the fact that mmWave channel experiences
rapid fluctuation, and the coherence time in mmWave frequen-
cies is around an order of magnitude lower than that at sub-6
GHz as the Doppler shift linearly scales with frequency [25,
37]. Moreover, mmWave links undergo more dramatic swings
between LoS and NLoS due to the high level of shadow-
ing [25]. Therefore, coding over many coherence intervals is
possible, and thus the average rate R can be achieved.
Since the malicious eavesdroppers only intercept the secrecy
massages passively without any transmissions, the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels cannot
be obtained by the transmitting node, and the transmission
rate of a typical transmitting node is only dependent on the
CSI of the channel between itself and the typical receiver. In
addition, the maximum average rate in an arbitrary wiretap
channel cannot exceed Re∗ . As such, we obtain the average
achievable secrecy rate in mmWave ad hoc networks as (6).
To evaluate the average achievable secrecy rate, we first
derive the average rate R, which is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The exact average rate between the typical
transmitting node and its intended receiver is given by
R =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1− Ξ1(z))Ξ2(z)e−zσ
2
odz, (7)
4Ξ1(z) = fPr (r) e
−zPtG
2
Mβ(max {r,d})
−αLoS
+ (1− fPr (r))e−zPtG
2
Mβ(max {r,d})
−αNLoS
(8)
Ξ2(z) = exp
(
− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
fPr (u) (1− Ω1(z, u))udu− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr (u))(1− Ω2(z, u))udu
)
(9)
with 
Ω1(z, u) =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
Prℓk × e−zPtGℓGkβ(max {u,d})
−αLoS
Ω2(z, u) =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
Prℓk × e−zPtGℓGkβ(max {u,d})
−αNLoS
where Ξ1(z) and Ξ2(z) are respectively given by (8) and (9)
at the top of next page2.
Proof 2: See Appendix A.
The exact average rate given in (7) can be lower bounded as
a simple expression, which is as follows.
Theorem 2: The lower bound of the average rate R is given
by
R
L
1 = log2
(
1 +
G2Mβr
−α
λG¯Λ + NoPt
)
, (10)
where α = (αLoS − αNLoS) fPr (r) + αNLoS, the average an-
tenna gain G¯ =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}GℓGkPrℓk, and Λ is
Λ = β2π
( ∫ d
0
(
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)rfPr (r) + d−αNLoSr
)
dr
+
∫ ∞
d
(
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS)fPr (r) + r1−αNLoS
)
dr
)
. (11)
When the LoS probability is fPr (R) = e
−̺R [28], (10)
reduces to a closed-form expression with
Λ = β2π×[1− e−d̺(1 + d̺)
̺2
(
1
dαLoS
− 1
dαNLoS
) +
Γ(2− αLoS, d̺)
̺2−αLoS
+
αNLoS · d2−αNLoS
2(αNLoS − 2) −
Γ(2− αNLoS, d̺)
̺2−αNLoS
]
. (12)
Proof 3: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 2, we find that as the transmit power grows
large, the average rate is asymptotically lower bounded as
R
L
1 → log2
(
1 +
G2Mβr
−α
λG¯Λ
)
. It is explicitly shown from (10)
that the average rate between the typical transmitting node
and its receiver is a decreasing function of transmitting node
density, and increases with narrower beam due to the lower
average interfering antenna gain. In addition, we have the
following important corollary.
Corollary 1: Given a required average rate Rth between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver, it is achievable when
2We consider that the typical legitimate channel and the interfering channels
are independent, due to the fact that the coherence time of mmWave channel
is around an order of hundreds of microseconds and much shorter than today’s
cellular systems, and mmWave links experience more dramatic swings in path
loss [25].
the transmitting node density in the mmWave ad hoc network
satisfies
λ ≤
(
G2Mβr
−α
2Rth − 1 −
No
Pt
)
G¯−1Λ−1. (13)
From (13), we see that narrower beams allow mmWave ad hoc
networks to accommodate more transmitting nodes.
We next derive the average rate between the typical trans-
mitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper, which is
given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The exact average rate between the typical
transmitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper is
given by
Re∗ =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(1− P1 (x)P2 (x))
1 + x
dx, (14)
where P1 (x) and P2 (x) are given in (15) and (16) with
1 (A) representing the indicator function that returns one if
the condition A is satisfied.
Proof 4: See Appendix C.
Substituting (7) and (14) into (5), we can thus evaluate the
average achievable secrecy rate in this network.
A. Simplified LoS MmWave Model
The aforementioned analysis is derived by considering an
arbitrary LoS probability, which is general. In this subsection,
we employ a simplified LoS mmWave model, as mentioned
in [28, 38]. In this model, the mmWave link is LoS if the
distance for a typical transmitting node-receiver is not larger
than the maximum LoS distance DLoS, and otherwise it is
outage. When an LoS link between a typical transmitting node
and its receiver is established (i.e., r < DLoS), the exact
average rate between the typical transmitting node and its
intended receiver given in Theorem 1 can be simplified as
Rˆ =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − e−zPtG2ML(r))Ξˆ2(z)e−zσ
2
odz, (17)
5P1 (x) = exp
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
fPr(re)re
∑
ℓ,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PtGℓGenβ
xσ2e
) 1
αLoS
)
Prℓndre
 (15)
P2 (x) = exp
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr(re))re
∑
ℓ,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PtGℓGenβ
xσ2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
Prℓndre
 (16)
where Ξˆ2(z) is calculated as
Ξˆ2(z) = exp
{
− 2πλ
[
D2LoS
2
−
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
Prℓk
(
d2
2
e−zPtG
2
Mβd
−αLoS
+ α−1LoS(zPtGℓGkβ)
2/αLoS(
Γ
(
− 2
αLoS
, zPtGℓGkβD
−αLoS
LoS
)
− Γ
(
− 2
αLoS
, zPtGℓGkβd
−αLoS
)))]}
. (18)
Here, Γ (·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function [39,
(8.350)].
It is explicitly shown from (17) that Rˆ is a decreasing
function of λ, since adding more transmitting nodes results
in larger interference.
Likewise, the exact average rate between the typical trans-
mitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper given in
Theorem 3 can be simplified as
Re∗ =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− exp
(
−2πλeFˆe (x)
)
1 + x
dx, (19)
where the cumulative distribution function is given by
Fˆe (x) =
∑
ℓ,n∈{M,m}
(
1 (d < η (Gℓ, G
e
n, x))
d2
2
+
̺2 − d2
2
)
Prℓn
(20)
with η (Gℓ, G
e
n, x) =
(PtGℓGenβ
xσ2e
) 1
αLoS and ̺ =
min (DLoS, η (Gℓ, G
e
n, x)).
It is explicitly shown from (19) that Re∗ is an increasing
function of λe, which means that the exact average rate
between the typical transmitting node and the most malicious
eavesdropper increases with the number of eavesdroppers.
Substituting (17) and (19) into (6), we can obtain the
average achievable secrecy rate.
B. Uniform Linear Array
We proceed to evaluate the secrecy performance when all
the nodes in this networks are equipped with ULA. Assume
that the number of antennas possessed by each eavesdropper
and the transmitting node are denoted by Ne and N , respec-
tively, and each receiver has the same number of antennas as
its transmitting node.
For ULA configuration with q antennas, the elements are
placed along the y-axis of the propagation plane with ∆τ
spacing. Hence, the array steering and response vectors for
the transmitting node and its receiver are written as [40]
at(ϕ, q) =
[
1, e−j
2π
ω
∆τ sin(ϕ),. . . , e−j
2π
ω
(q−1)∆τ sin(ϕ)
]T
(21)
and
ar(ξ, q) =
[
1, e−j
2π
ω
∆τ sin(ξ),. . . , e−j
2π
ω
(q−1)∆τ sin(ξ)
]T
,
(22)
respectively, where ω is the wavelength, ϕ ∼ U(0, 2π)
and ξ ∼ U(0, 2π) are the azimuth angle of departure
(AoD) and angle of arrival (AoA), respectively, and (·)T
denotes transpose. The channel model is established as H =√
L(R)A (ξr, ϕt) with the ULA steering matrix A (ξr, ϕt) =
ar(ξr, q)a
H
t (ϕt, q), where (·)H is the conjugate transpose.
We consider that matched filter (MF) beamforming is
adopted at all the nodes including eavesdroppers, the trans-
mitting nodes and their receivers for maximizing the received
signal power. Note that MF is the optimal beamforming for
eavesdroppers, since interference is negligible at the eaves-
droppers. Hence, the antenna gain for a typical transmitting
node seen by its receiver is
Go =
∣∣∣∣aHr (ξro , N)√N A (ξro , ϕto) at(ϕto , N)√N
∣∣∣∣2 = N2, (19)
and the antenna gain for an interferer i seen by the typical
receiver is
Gi =
∣∣∣∣aHr (ξro , N)√N A (ξri,o , ϕti,o) at(ϕti , N)√N
∣∣∣∣2 . (20)
Based on (21) and (22), after some manipulations, we have
Gi =
1
N2
[
1− cos(NK1(ξri,o))
][
1− cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
][
1− cos(K1(ξri,o))
][
1− cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
] ,
(21)
where K1
(
ξri,o
)
= 2π∆τω (sin(ξro) − sin(ξri,o)),
K2
(
ϕti,o , ϕti
)
= 2π∆τω (sin(ϕti,o)− sin(ϕti)).
Based on Theorem 2, the average rate between the typical
transmitting node and its intended receiver is lower bounded
as
R
L
ULA = log2
(
1 +
N2βr−α
λG¯ΛULA +
No
Pt
)
, (22)
6PULA1 (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PtGe(ϕte,o )β
xσ2e
) 1
αLoS
)
fPr(re)
2π
redϕte,odre
}
(26)
PULA2 (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PtGe(ϕte,o )β
xσ2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
1− fPr(re)
2π
redϕte,odre
}
(27)
where ΛULA is given from (11) with the average antenna gain
G¯ = E [Gi] =
1
N2
E
[
1− cos(NK1(ξri,o ))
1− cos(K1(ξri,o))
]
×
E
[
1− cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
1− cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
]
. (23)
Since the beam-direction of the typical node and each inter-
ferer is a uniform random variable on [0, 2π], we can further
obtain
G¯ =
1
N2
∫ 2π
0
1− cos(NK1(ξri,o))
1− cos(K1(ξri,o))
1
2π
dξri,o×∫ 2π
0
∫ 2π
0
1− cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
1− cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti))
1
4π2
dϕti,odϕti . (24)
Likewise, the antenna gain Ge seen from the eavesdropper
e ∈ Φe is
Ge
(
ϕte,o
)
=
∣∣∣∣aHr (ξre,o , Ne)√N A (ξre,o , ϕte,o) at(ϕto , N)√N
∣∣∣∣2
=
(
Ne
N
)2 1− cos(NK3(ϕte,o))
1− cos(K3(ϕte,o ))
, (25)
where K3
(
ϕte,o
)
= 2π∆τω (sin(ϕte,o) − sin(ϕto )). From
(25), we find that increasing the number of antennas at the
transmitting node decreases the antenna gain obtained by
the eavesdroppers, which is helpful for degrading the signal
strength at the eavesdroppers. Based on Theorem 3, the exact
average rate R
ULA
e∗ between the typical transmitting node
and the most malicious eavesdropper is given from (14) by
interchanging P1 (x) → PULA1 (x) and P2 (x) → PULA2 (x),
where PULA1 (x) and PULA2 (x) are given by (26) and (27),
respectively. Thus, by using ULA, the average achievable
secrecy rate can at least reach
R
L
s,ULA =
[
R
L
ULA −R
ULA
e∗
]+
. (28)
IV. ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDED TRANSMISSION
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance for the
artificial noise aided transmission [20]. For this case, the total
power per transmission is Pt = PS + PA, where the power
allocated to the information signal is PS = µPt, and the power
allocated to the artificial noise is PA = (1 − µ)Pt. Here, µ
is the fraction of power assigned to the information signal.
The effective antenna gain GSi for the information signal of
an interfering i seen by the typical receiver is expressed as
GSi =

GSMGM, Pr
S
MM =
ϑθ
(2π)2
,
GSMGm, Pr
S
Mm =
ϑ(2π−θ)
(2π)2
,
GSmGM, Pr
S
mM =
(2π−ϑ)θ
(2π)2
,
GSmGm, Pr
S
mm =
(2π−ϑ)(2π−θ)
(2π)2
,
(29)
where ϑ, GSM and G
S
m are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain for the information signal
of an interfering i, respectively. Likewise, the effective antenna
gain for the artificial noise of an interfering i seen by the
typical receiver is expressed as
GAi =

GAMGM, Pr
A
MM =
ςθ
(2π)2
,
GAMGm, Pr
A
Mm =
ς(2π−θ)
(2π)2
,
GAmGM, Pr
A
mM =
(2π−ς)θ
(2π)2
,
GAmGm, Pr
A
mm =
(2π−ς)(2π−θ)
(2π)2
,
(30)
where ς , GAM and G
A
m are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain for the artificial noise of
an interfering i, respectively. The effective antenna gain GSe
and GAe for the information signal and artificial noise of the
typical transmitting node seen by the eavesdropper e ∈ Φe can
be respectively given from (29) and (30) by interchanging the
parameters GM → GeM, Gm → Gem and θ → φ.
Since the beam of the artificial noise at the typical trans-
mitting node will not be directed to the typical receiver,
the artificial noise sent by the typical transmitting node has
negligible effect on the typical receiver [20], the SINR at the
typical receiver is given by
γ˜o =
PSG
S
MGML (r)∑
i∈Φ/o
(
PSGSi + PAG
A
i
)
L (|Xi|) + σ2o
. (31)
The SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
γ˜e∗ = max
e∈Φe
{
PSG
S
eL (|Xe|)
PAGAe L (|Xe|) + σ2e
}
. (32)
Following (6), the average achievable secrecy rate for the
artificial noise aided transmission is written as
R˜S =
[
R˜− R˜∗e
]+
, (33)
where R˜ = E [log2 (1 + γ˜o)] and R˜
∗
e = E [log2 (1 + γ˜e∗)], R˜
and R˜∗e are given by the following theorems.
Theorem 4: The exact average rate for the artificial noise
aided transmission between the typical transmitting node and
its intended receiver is given by
R˜ =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1− Ξ˜1(z))Ξ˜2(z)e−zσ
2
0dz, (34)
7Ξ˜1(z) = fPr (r) e
−zPSG
S
M
GMβ(max {r,d})
−αLoS
+ (1− fPr (r))e−zPSG
S
M
GMβ(max {r,d})
−αNLoS
(35)
Ξ˜2(z) = exp
(
− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
fPr (u) (1− Ω˜1(z, u))udu− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr (u))(1− Ω˜2(z, u))udu
)
(36)
with 
Ω˜1(z, u) =
∑
ℓ,ν,k∈{M,m}
PrSℓkPr
A
νk
Prk
× e−z(PSGSℓ Gk+PAGAν Gk)β(max {u,d})−αLoS
Ω˜2(z, u) =
∑
ℓ,ν,k∈{M,m}
PrSℓkPr
A
νk
Prk
× e−z(PSGSℓ Gk+PAGAν Gk)β(max {u,d})−αNLoS
P˜1 (x) = exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
fPr(re)re
∑
ℓ,ν,n∈{M,m}
PrSℓnPr
A
νn
Pren
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PSGSℓ Genβ − PAGAν Genβx
xσ2e
) 1
αLoS
)
dre
}
(41)
P˜2 (x) = exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
(1− fPr(re))re
∑
ℓ,ν,n∈{M,m}
PrSℓnPr
A
νn
Pren
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PSGSℓ Genβ − PAGAν Genβx
xσ2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
dre
}
(42)
where Ξ˜1(z) and Ξ˜2(z) are respectively given by (35) and (36)
at the top of next page. In (36), PrM =
θ
2π and Prm = 1−PrM.
Proof 5: It can be proved by following a similar approach
shown in the Theorem 1.
Using the similar approach shown in the Appendix B, the
exact average rate given in (34) can be lower bounded as a
simple expression, which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The lower bound of the average rate R˜ is
R˜L1 = log2
(
1 +
GSMGMβr
−α
λΛ˜ + NoµPt
)
, (37)
where Λ˜ is
Λ˜ =
(
G¯S +
1− µ
µ
G¯A
)
β2π
×
(∫ d
0
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)rfPr (r) + d−αNLoSrdr
+
∫ ∞
d
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS)fPr (r) + r1−αNLoSdr
)
. (38)
with
G¯S =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
GSℓ GkPr
S
ℓk, G¯A =
∑
ν,k∈{M,m}
GAν GkPr
A
νk.
Based on Theorem 5, we have the following important
corollary.
Corollary 2: The required average rate R˜th between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver can be achieved when
the transmitting node density satisfies
λ ≤
(
GSMGMβr
−α
2R˜th − 1
− No
µPt
)
Λ˜−1. (39)
We next present the average rate between the typical trans-
mitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper as follows.
Theorem 6: The exact average rate for the artificial noise
aided transmission between the typical transmitting node and
the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
R˜∗e =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(
1− P˜1 (x) P˜2 (x)
)
1 + x
dx, (40)
where P˜1 (x) and P˜2 (x) are respectively given by (41) and
(42). In (41) and (42), PreM =
φ
2π and Pr
e
m = 1− PreM.
Proof 6: It can be proved by following a similar approach
shown in the Theorem 2.
Substituting (34) and (40) into (33), we obtain the average
achievable secrecy rate for the artificial noise aided transmis-
sion.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented to understand the impact
of mmWave channel characteristics and large antenna array
on the achievable secrecy rate. We assume that the LoS
probability function is fPr (R) = e
−̺R with 1/̺ = 141.4
m [28]. The mmWave bandwidth is BW = 2 GHz, the noise
figure is Nf = 10 dB, the noise power is σ2o = σ
2
e =
−174 + 10 log 10(BW)+Nf dBm, and the reference distance
is d = 1.
We focus on the carrier frequency at 28 GHz, 38 GHz, 60
GHz, and 73GHz, in which their LoS and NLoS path loss
exponents are shown in Table I based on the practical channel
measurements [41, 42].
A. Average Achievable Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we consider the uniform planar array
(UPA) with the antenna pattern shown in Table II. The
transmitting nodes and their receivers are equipped with N
8TABLE I
PATH LOSS EXPONENT FOR MM-WAVE OUTDOOR CHANNELS [41, 42].
Path loss exponent 28GHz 38 GHz 60 GHz 73 GHz
LOS 2 2 2.25 2
Strongest NLOS 3 3.71 3.76 3.4
TABLE II
ANTENNA PATTERN [43].
Number of antenna elements N
Beamwidth θ
2pi√
N
Main-lobe gain N
Side-lobe gain
1
sin2(3pi/2
√
N)
antennas each, and each eavesdropper is equipped with Ne
antennas.
Fig. 1 shows the effects of transmit power on the average
achievable secrecy rate. We utilize four commonly-considered
mmWave carrier frequencies, namely 28 GHz, 38 GHz, 60
GHz and 73 GHz, which have different β values given by
β = ( c4πfc )
2 in Section II and path loss exponents in Table
I. The analytical curves are obtained from (6), which are
validated by the Monte Carlo simulations marked by ’+’.
We observe that there exist optimal transmit power values
for maximizing average achievable secrecy rate at all the
commonly-considered mmWave frequencies. In the low trans-
mit power regime, better secrecy performance is achieved at
28 GHz, and higher average achievable secrecy rate can be
obtained in the higher mmWave frequency band (60 GHz and
73 GHz) as the transmit power becomes large. The reason
is that in the low transmit power regime, mmWave ad hoc
network tends to be noise-limited, and mmWave link at lower
mmWave frequencies experiences lower path loss and has
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Fig. 1. Effects of transmit power on the average achievable secrecy rate at
28 GHz, 38 GHz, 60 GHz and 73 GHz: λ = 50/km2, λe = 100/km
2,
N = 16, and r = 15 m.
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Fig. 2. Effects of transmitting node density on the average achievable secrecy
rate at 60 GHz: N = 16, Ne = 16, r = 15 m, and Pt = 30 dBm.
stronger signal strength, which results in better performance.
However, in the high transmit power regime, mmWave ad
hoc network becomes interference-limited. In this case, the
interference received by a legitimate node becomes lower and
the signal strength of the eavesdropper is also reduced at
higher mmWave frequencies, due to the higher path loss at
higher mmWave frequencies. In addition, it is shown that the
secrecy performance at 60 GHz is better than that at 73 GHz
when the transmit power is large enough, due to the fact that
mmWave link at 60 GHz has higher LoS path loss exponent
than that at 73 GHz [41, 42] (2.25 at 60 GHz and 2 at 73 GHz
in this figure based on the practical channel measurements
in [41, 42]), which leads to less interference received by a
legitimate node and lower signal strength of the eavesdropper
at 60 GHz. Additionally, using the antenna pattern in Table II,
average achievable secrecy rate is a bit lower at Ne = 16 than
that at Ne = 4, due to fact that more effective antenna gain
obtained by eavesdroppers using UPA with Ne = 16, which
deteriorates the secrecy performance.
Fig. 2 shows the effects of transmitting node density on
the average achievable secrecy rate at 60 GHz. We see that
when increasing the transmitting node density, the average
achievable secrecy rate declines. The reason is that when
the transmitting nodes are dense, mmWave ad hoc networks
becomes interference-limited, and the interference caused by
other transmitting nodes dominate the performance. It is
confirmed that in the large-scale mmWave ad hoc networks,
more eavesdroppers have a detrimental effect on the secrecy.
Fig. 3 shows the effects of different typical distances on the
average rate at 60 GHz. The green solid and dashed curves
with triangles obtained from (7) and (10) represent the exact
and lower-bound average rate between the typical transmitting
node and its intended receiver, respectively, and the orange
solid curve with circles obtained from (14) represents the
average rate in the most malicious eavesdropping channel. We
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Fig. 3. Effects of transmit power with different typical distances on the
average rate at 28 GHz: Pt = 10 dBm, λ = 10/km2, λe = 100/km2,
N = 16, and Ne = 16.
observe that the lower bound curves can efficiently predict
the performance behavior. It is shown that when the commu-
nication distance grows large, there is a significant decrease
in the average achievable secrecy rate, due to the fact that
the average rate between the typical transmitting node and its
receiver decreases while the average rate in the most malicious
eavesdropper’s channel is unaltered. This illustrates that the
secrecy rate in mmWave ad hoc networks is highly dependent
on the communication distance between the transmitting node
and its receiver.
B. average achievable secrecy rate with ULA
In this subsection, we consider the ULA configuration, and
choose the antenna spacing as △τ = 12ω. The results in Figs.
4 and 5 are obtained from (28).
Fig. 4 shows the average achievable secrecy rate with differ-
ent number of antennas at the transmitting nodes and eaves-
droppers. It is observed that the average achievable secrecy
rate increases with the number of antennas at the transmitting
nodes, and decreases when eavesdroppers are equipped with
more antennas. Moreover, the average achievable secrecy rate
becomes very small when the transmitting node only has a
couple of antennas. The reason is that the information signal
beam is not narrow and more eavesdroppers can receive strong
signals when they have more receive antennas.
Fig. 5 shows the achievable average achievable secrecy rate
for different node densities. We see that more eavesdrop-
pers located in the networks are indeed harmful for secrecy.
However, when the density of transmitting nodes increases,
the secrecy performance also degrades, which indicates that
interference can still be a concern for super dense transmitting
nodes without highly directional antennas.
30
25
20
15
N
e
10
55
10
N
15
20
25
30
10
8
6
4
2
0
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
ch
ie
va
bl
e 
se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 (b
it/s
/H
z)
Fig. 4. Effects of different antenna numbers on the average achievable secrecy
rate at 38 GHz: λ = 50/km2, λe = 100/km2, r = 20 m, Pt = 10 dBm,
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rate at 38 GHz: N = 16, Ne = 4, r = 20 m, Pt = 10 dBm, ξro = pi/3,
ϕto = pi/3.
C. average achievable secrecy rate with Artificial Noise
In this subsection, we examine the effects of artificial noise
(AN) on the secrecy performance.
Fig. 6 shows the effects of transmit power with/without AN
at 60 GHz. We consider that the antenna beam patterns of
sending information signal and AN at the transmitting node
are (GSM, G
S
m, ϑ) = (3 dB,−3 dB, 45o) and (GAM, GAm, ς) =
(3 dB,−3 dB, 45o), respectively, and the antenna beam pat-
tern of only sending information signal without AN at the
transmitting node is (GM, Gm, θ) = (10 dB,−10 dB, 15o),
as seen in [3]. The analytical curves without/with AN are
obtained from (6) and (33), respectively. We see that when the
10
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Fig. 6. Effects of transmit power with/without AN on the average achievable
secrecy rate at 60 GHz: λ = 20/km2, λe = 300/km2, r = 50 m, and
µ = 0.85.
transmitting nodes are not dense (λ = 20/km2 in this figure),
the average achievable secrecy rate increases with the transmit
power. In this case, the use of AN with power allocation
factor µ = 0.85 may not be able to improve secrecy3, and
more power should be allocated to the information signal, to
combat the severe interference and mmWave pathloss. Such
phenomenon has also been mentioned in the prior work [44]
with lower frequencies (See Fig. 7 in [44]), which is different
from the results in the non large-scale physical layer security
model. Moreover, it is indicated that eavesdroppers using wide
beam pattern can intercept more information.
Fig. 7 shows the effects of transmit power with/without
AN in different frequency bands, i.e., 28 GHz and 38 GHz.
The lower-bound results with/without AN are obtained by
using (37) and (10) to calculate the average rate between the
transmitting node and its receiver, respectively. We see that the
lower bound results can well approximate the exact ones when
the transmit power is not large (< 30 dBm in this figure). The
average achievable secrecy rate at 28 GHz is larger than that
at 38 GHz, which indicates that the use of lower frequency
bands could achieve better secrecy performance. The average
achievable secrecy rate increases with transmit power, and the
use of AN cannot improve the secrecy. The reason is that
in this circumstance, more power should be used to enhance
the transmission rate between the transmitting node and its
receiver.
Fig. 8 shows the effects of transmit power allocation factor
on the average achievable secrecy rate. We see that there exists
an optimal µ to maximize the average achievable secrecy rate,
which reveals that AN can help enhance secrecy when the
power allocation between the information signal and AN is
3Note that the optimal power allocation for AN aided transmission is
infeasible in the passive eavesdropping scenario, where the CSI of the
eavesdropping channels cannot be obtained by the transmitter or legitimate
receiver.
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properly set. Again, we see that larger communication distance
r deteriorates the secrecy performance. In addition, for a given
r, secrecy transmission at 28 GHz is better than that at 38 GHz.
VI. CONCLUSION
We concentrated on the secure communication in mmWave
ad hoc networks by using physical layer security. We derived
the average achievable secrecy rate without/with artificial
noise. A tractable approach was developed to evaluate the
average achievable secrecy rate when nodes are equipped with
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ULA. The results have highlighted the impacts of different
mmWave frequencies, transmit power, node density and an-
tenna gains on the secrecy performance. Important insights
have been provided into the interplay between transmit power
and mmWave frequency. When the node density is dense,
the interference from nearby nodes dominates the secrecy
performance. It is shown that power allocation between the
information signal and AN needs to be carefully determined
for secrecy performance enhancement.
In this paper, we assume that the distance r between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver is constant. In the
future work, we highlight that it is important to study the case
of the dynamic r following a certain distribution to model the
specified scenarios. In addition, new antenna pattern models
are needed to well characterize the effective antenna gain for a
random interferer seen by the typical receiver when the number
of mmWave antennas grows large.
APPENDIX A: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
Using [45, Lemma 1], the average rate R is calculated as
R =E [log2 (1 + γ0)] = E
[
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1− e−zγo)e−zdz
]
=
1
ln 2
E
[∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1− e−zY )e−z(I+σ20)dz
]
(a)
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1− E [e−zY ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ1(z)
)E
[
e−zI
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ2(z)
e−zσ
2
0dz, (A.1)
where step (a) is obtained based on the fact that Y and I
are independent in the ad hoc networks, Y = PtG
2
ML (r) is
dependent on the LoS or NLoS condition given a distance r,
and the interference I is
I =
∑
i∈Φ/o
PtGiL (|Xi|). (A.2)
Based on the law of total expectation, we can directly ob-
tain Ξ1(z) as (8). Then, we see that Ξ2(z) is the Laplace
transform of I. To solve it, using the thinning theorem [46],
the mmWave transmitting nodes are divided into two inde-
pendent PPPs, namely LoS point process ΦLoS with density
function λfPr(R), and NLoS point processΦNLoS with density
function λ(1− fPr(R)). Accordingly, by using the Slivnyak’s
theorem [46], Ξ2(z) is given by
Ξ2(z) = E
[
e−zI
]
= E
[
e−z(ILoS+INLoS)
]
= E
[
e−zILoS
]
E
[
e−zINLoS
]
(A.3)
with  ILoS =
∑
i∈ΦLoS
PtGiL (|Xi|),
INLoS =
∑
i∈ΦNLoS
PtGiL (|Xi|).
(A.4)
By applying the Laplace functional of the PPP [46],
E
[
e−zILoS
]
= exp
(
− 2πλ×∫ ∞
0
fPr (u)
(
1− E
[
e−zPtGiβ(max {u,d})
−αLoS
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω1
)
udu
)
. (A.5)
Based on the array gain distribution in (1) and the law of total
expectation, Ω1 is obtained as
Ω1(z, u) =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
Prℓk × e−zPtGℓGkβ(max {u,d})
−αLoS
. (A.6)
Likewise, we can derive E
[
e−zINLoS
]
. Then, we get Ξ2(z) in
(9). Based on (A.1) and (9), we attain the desired result in (7)
and complete the proof.
APPENDIX B: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF EQ. (10)
The average rate between the typical transmitting node and
its intended receiver can be tightly lower bounded as [47]
R¯L1 = log2
(
1 + eE[ln γo]
)
, (B.1)
where E [ln γo] is calculated as
E [ln γo] =E
[
ln
(
PtG
2
Mβr
−αo
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z1
+
E
[
ln
(
1∑
i∈Φ/o PtGiβ|Xi,o|−αi +No
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z2
.
(B.2)
Since the typical link can be either LoS or NLoS, using the
law of total probability, Z1 is calculated as
Z1 = ln
(
PtG
2
Mβ
)− (fPr (r)αLoS + (1− fPr (r))αNLoS) ln r,
(B.3)
where αLoS and αNLoS are the path loss exponents of the LoS
and the NLoS, respectively.
Considering the convexity of ln
(
1
1+x
)
and using Jensen’s
inequality, we derive the lower bound on the Z2 as
ZL2 = ln
(
1
E
[∑
i∈Φ/o
PtGiβ|Xi,o|−αi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
+No
)
. (B.4)
Using a similar approach in (A.3), Λ is derived as
Λ = E
[∑
i∈ΦLoS
PtGiβ
(
max {|Xi,o| , d}−αLoS
)]
+E
[∑
i∈ΦNLoS
PtGiβ
(
max {|Xi,o| , d}−αNLoS
)]
(b)
= PtG¯β2πλ×
( ∫ d
0
(
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)rfPr (r) + d−αNLoSr
)
dr
+
∫ ∞
d
(
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS)fPr (r) + r1−αNLoS
)
dr
)
,
(B.5)
where G¯ is the average array gain. Here, step (b) results from
using Campbell’s theorem [26]. Based on (1) and using the
law of total expectation, G¯ is calculated as
G¯ = E {Gi} =
∑
ℓ,k∈{M,m}
GℓkPrℓk. (B.6)
Substituting (B.3), (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.2), we obtain
E {ln γo} in (B.1), and the desired result (10).
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APPENDIX C: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
The average rate Re∗ is calculated as
Re∗ = E [log2 (1 + γe∗)]
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fγe∗ (x))
1 + x
dx, (C.1)
where Fγe∗ (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of γe∗ . By using the thinning theorem [26], the eavesdroppers
are divided into the LoS point process ΦLoSe with density
function λefPr(R), and NLoS point process Φ
NLoS
e with
density function λe(1− fPr(R)). Then, Fγe∗ (·) is given by
Fγe∗ (x) = Pr (γe∗ < x)
= Pr
(
max
{
γLoSe∗ , γ
NLoS
e∗
}
< x
)
= Pr
(
γLoSe∗ < x
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1(x)
Pr
(
γNLoSe∗ < x
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2(x)
, (C.2)
where 
γLoSe∗ = max
e∈ΦLoSe
{
PtGeL (|Xe|)
σ2e
}
,
γNLoSe∗ = max
e∈ΦNLoSe
{
PtGeL (|Xe|)
σ2e
}
.
(C.3)
We first derive P1 (x) as
P1 (x) = Pr
(
γLoSe∗ < x
)
= E
 ∏
e∈ΦLoSe
Pr
(
PtGeβ (max {re, d})−αLoS
σ2e
< x
)
(c)
= exp
{
− 2πλe×∫ ∞
0
Pr
(PtGeβ (max {re, d})−αLoS
σ2e
> x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
fPr(re)redre
}
,
(C.4)
where step (c) is obtained by using the Laplace functional.
Based on the law of total probability, Θ is calculated as
Θ =
∑
ℓ,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
(PtGℓGenβ
xσ2e
) 1
αLoS
)
Prℓn,
(C.5)
Substituting (C.5) into (C.4), we get P1 (x) in (15). Then,
P2 (x) is similarly derived as (16).
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